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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance 
among operating firms, and compares it with a similar economy but with perfect tax enforcement. I 
develop a competitive general equilibrium model where imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate 
outcomes through two mechanisms. First, it may distort firms' optimal output level as long as the 
probability of avoiding tax compliance is related to the firm's size. Second, poor tax enforcement may 
lead to a low provision of the public goods that complement firms' productivity. The results for a 
calibrated version of the model suggest that in economies with tax enforcement problems, aggregate 
output might be reduced by 12 percent. I also conclude that sizable aggregate effects can be obtained only 
when the public goods mechanism is at work.  
Keywords: tax enforcement; public goods; informal sector; size distribution of firms  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance 
among operating firms, and compares it with a similar economy but with perfect tax enforcement. I 
develop a competitive general equilibrium model where imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate 
outcomes through two mechanisms. First, it may distort firms' optimal output level as long as the 
probability of avoiding tax compliance is related to the firm's size. Second, poor tax enforcement may 
lead to a low provision of public goods that complement firms' productivity. The results for a calibrated 
version of the model suggest that in economies with tax enforcement problems, aggregate output might be 
reduced by 12 percent and the economy’s total factor productivity (TFP) by 9 percent. I also conclude that 
sizable aggregate effects can be obtained only when the public goods mechanism is at work. 
In this paper I take the ability of a government to enforce tax compliance as an exogenous feature 
of the economy. I also restrict the tax system to rely completely on taxation of corporate profits. Thus the 
exercise here is to compare two economies that are identical except for the capacity of the government to 
enforce tax compliance among firms. Are aggregate equilibrium outcomes (output, TFP, average firm 
size, and wages) among these two economies different? If they are, then by how much? Those are the 
questions I try to answer in this paper. 
There is empirical cross-country evidence that a strong system of legal enforcement is correlated 
with economic development either directly (Keefer and Knack 1995) or indirectly through the 
development of the financial system (La Porta et al. 1998). Here I investigate a particular channel by 
which legal enforcement may affect economic performance, namely, through the capacity to enforce tax 
compliance. In any economy taxes are necessary to raise revenue for the government, and that revenue 
allows the government to operate and to provide public goods and services. This paper considers the case 
of a benevolent government that runs a neutral tax system
1
Governments that face tax compliance problems are usually not able to generate sufficient fiscal 
revenues, which may translate into a low provision of public services and goods. This link between 
enforcement capacity, the informal sector, and provision of public goods has been studied by Loayza 
(1996). Furthemore, the contribution of public infrastructure to output and productivity has been studied 
by Aschauer (1981); Lynde and Richmond (1993); Gramlich (1994); and Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and 
Porter (1996). In this literature it is widely accepted that public infrastructure and aggregate productivity 
 and that maximizes aggregate consumption. 
However, distortions may arise because of constraints in the set of policies available to the government. 
In particular, the government is constrained by its tax enforcement technology. 
One implication of a government's lack of enforcement capacity that has received some attention 
in the economic literature is the emergence of the informal sector, understood as the set of economic 
agents that do not comply with government regulations and taxes. A general view is that informality 
arrives as the response of the private sector to excessive or distortionary taxes and regulations (De Soto 
1986; Maloney 2004; Rauch 1991), and in that sense it has the effect of reducing potential negative 
aggregate effects of government-imposed distortions on the economy. Other studies emphasize the role of 
the informal sector as a source of inefficiencies. Loayza (1996) develops a simple growth model in which 
the presence of the informal sector negatively affects growth by reducing the availability of public goods. 
Amaral and Quintin (2006) study a competitive model in which commitment problems are introduced in 
the economy due to the presence of the informal sector. Recently, De Paula and Scheinkman (2006) have 
developed a competitive model with two stages of production that highlights the role of value-added taxes 
in transmitting informality, which in turn affects firms' size decisions and the capital-labor mix. A series 
of case studies in The McKinsey Quarterly (Elstrodt, Capp, and Jones 2005; Farrell 2004; Fergie, Elstrodt, 
and Laboissire 2006; Lenoro, Elstrodt, and Urdapilleta 2002; Carioca, Pietracci, and Diniz 2004) suggests 
that the informal economy allows for the existence of less efficient firms and therefore contributes to 
lowering the overall productivity of the economy. 
                                                      
1 The tax system considered here is one such that an economy with perfect tax enforcement and no public goods does not 
introduce any distortion into the economy. 2 
 
are positively correlated, and the work by Fernald (1999) has been an important contribution to 
empirically establish causality. He shows a positive effect of roads on U.S. productivity. At the theoretical 
level tthis causality is present in the growth model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) with congestible 
public goods. 
At the empirical level Gordon and Li (2005) have recently documented that tax revenue as a 
fraction of GDP is surprisingly low in developing countries compared with developed ones. I take this as 
an indicator of relatively low enforcement capacity in the developing world. Furthermore, it is a well-
known fact that the presence of large informal sectors is an important characteristic of the developing 
world. Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) have estimated that the average size of the shadow economy over 
1999–2000 in developing countries is 41 percent. Additionally, using cross-country data, I find the 
following evidence (see Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2): 
•  Fact 1a: Provision of public services is negatively correlated with the size of the informal 
economy.  
•  Fact 1b: Provision of public services is positively correlated with tax revenues (as a 
percentage of GDP).  
•  Fact 2: Provision of public services is positively correlated with GDP per capita, TFP, and 
output per worker.  
•  Fact 3: GDP per capita, output per worker, and TFP are negatively correlated with the size of 
the informal economy.  
At the firm level, it is a well-established regularity that informality is negatively correlated with 
firm size. Moreover, the McKinsey case studies show convincing evidence that informal firms are less 
productive than formal ones. 
The model developed in this paper emphasizes all of these empirical regularities. Building on a 
modified version of the Lucas span-of-control model (Lucas 1978) with a fixed labor supply, I introduce 
public goods into the model and, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Loayza (1996), consider 
the case of congestible public goods. The government's tax enforcement technology enters the model as a 
probability that a firm's profits are seized if it does not pay taxes; this probability is increasing in firm's 
output. In doing this I follow De Paula and Scheinkman (2006). The mechanics of the model are 
straightforward: When the tax enforcement technology is not perfect, some firms may find it optimal to 
not pay taxes and face an incentive to reduce their output level to keep a low probability of being caught 
by the authorities. This reduces aggregate labor demand, which calls for a lower equilibrium wage, which 
in turn facilitates the operation of low-productivity firms. A second mechanism works through the 
availability of public goods. The fraction of firms that in equilibrium decides not to pay taxes (informal 
sector) is high when there is a poor tax enforcement technology. In this way tax revenue and the provision 
of public goods as well as the overall productivity of the economy are negatively affected. As far as I 
know this is the first paper to consider the inclusion of public goods in a version of the Lucas (1978) 
span-of-control model. Another novel feature is that this paper explicitly introduces a non-distortionary 
tax system in a model that endogenously generates informal firms. In calibrating the model I use the 
observed size distribution of firms in the United States to back out the distribution of idiosyncratic 
productivity (or managerial talent). In order to calibrate the contribution of the public goods to the 
economy, I use the observed corporate tax rate by assuming it is the one that maximizes aggregate 
consumption.  
In the next section the model is introduced. Section 3 explains the calibration strategy. Section 4 
discusses the results, and in Section 5, I provide some final comments. 
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2.  THE MODEL 
This model is set up to study an economy in which the government has limited capacity to enforce 
corporate tax compliance. First I describe a model in which the government has full tax enforcement 
capacity, and then I introduce the notion of an imperfect tax enforcement technology. 
Setup 
I consider a one-period economy
2
c ˆ
 populated by a mass one of households. This is a one-good economy, 
and each household has an endowment of  units of the good. There are two individuals in each 
household, a worker and an entrepreneur. All workers across households are identical in that they provide 
the same quality of labor services. In contrast, entrepreneurs are characterized by a parameter θ , which 
indicates their idiosyncratic quality in entrepreneurship or managerial talent. I use θ  as an index for 
households and entrepreneurs since there is no other source of heterogeneity across households. θ  is 
distributed according to a cumulative density function (CDF)  ) (θ G  with  0 = (0) G  and  0 > ) (θ G′  for 
) (0,∞ ∈ θ . An entrepreneur that employs l workers and k  units of capital and has access to ρ  units of 
public goods produces output equal to 
γ θ ρ ) , ( ) ( = l k f h y , where  (.) f  is homogenous of degree 1 and 
1 < < 0 γ . The parameter γ  determines the degree of diminishing returns to scale of the production 
process; ρ  represents the amount of public goods available to each production unit; and  (.) h  is a strictly 
increasing and concave function. Capital is provided from outside the economy in infinite supply at a 
rental price r . 
Within household θ  the only decision maker is the entrepreneur. Her objective is to maximize 
the household's consumption c, which is a linear combination of both members' consumption. 
Entrepreneur θ  faces the following decisions for given prices w and r , access to public goods ρ , and 
tax rate τ : the quantity of labor supply from the household's worker, whether or not she runs a production 
unit, and if so then how much labor l and capital k  to hire. Since the worker's income can only add to 
household's consumption, it is optimal that the worker inelastically supply his unit of labor. The rest of 
the analysis takes this optimal decision as given. Thus, the problem of entrepreneur θ  is  
  c
l k x
   max
0 0, {0,1}, ≥ ≥ ∈
  (1) 
  c w c rk wl l k f h x c ˆ ) ~ ) , ( ) ( )( (1 =    s.t. + + − − − −
γ θ ρ τ , 
where  c ~ is a fixed cost,  x  is the decision to run a firm ( 1 = x  if she decides to run a firm, and 0  
otherwise), and τ  is the tax rate on the firm's profit. I break down Equation 1 into two problems. First, 
entrepreneur θ  maximizes profits as if she were to run a production unit or a firm
3
) ~ ) , ( ) ( )( (1 max
,
c rk wl l k f h
l k
− − − −
γ θ ρ τ
:  
    (2) 
                                                      
2 I do not introduce dynamics since here I am not interested in inter-temporal distortions. One can think of the one-period 
economy described here as the steady state of a dynamic model with entry and exit of firms (as in Hopenhayn 1992), where the 
exit rate will be given by those firms that are caught not paying taxes. Also note that because this is a static model I do not model 
any accumulation process either for private capital or public goods. 
3 I use these terms interchangeably. 4 
 
Denote the solutions to Equation 2 as  ) (θ l  and  ) (θ k . I show in Appendix C that  ) (θ l , 
γ θ θ θ ρ θ )) ( ), ( ( ) ( = ) ( l k f h y , and  c rk wl y ~ ) ( ) ( ) ( = ) ( − − − θ θ θ θ π  are increasing in θ  and that 
) ~ ) ( ) )((1 (1 = ) ( c y − − − θ γ τ θ π . 
Also notice that the optimal capital-labor ratio is independent of the entrepreneur's quality θ  as 
well as of τ and  ) (ρ h . 
Second, given profits  ) (θ π , entrepreneur θ  decides whether or not to run a firm:  




) ( ) (1 max
{0,1}
θ π τ   (3) 
Denote the solution to Equation 3 as  ) (θ x . As long as  0 < ) (θ π  it is optimal not run a firm and 
0 = ) (θ x ; but if  0 > ) (θ π , then  1 = ) (θ x . Since  ) (θ π  is increasing in θ , there exists a marginal 
entrepreneur  0 θ  who is indifferent about running a firm. I assume  1 = ) ( 0 θ x . Therefore  1 = ) (θ x  if 
} { 0 θ θ θ ≥ ∈ ; otherwise  0 = ) (θ x . 
In this economy there is a government that can only tax firms' profits
4
τ
 and uses tax revenues to 
finance the provision of public goods. In particular the government announces a tax rate   such that 
every firm is supposed to pay τ  fraction of its profits as taxes. Consider first the perfect enforcement 
case, where the government has the ability to enforce tax compliance of all operating firms. Total tax 
revenues are then  
  ) ( ) ( ) (1 = =




  (4) 
where  ) ( ) ( ) ( =
0 θ θ π θ dG x ∫
∞
Π  is aggregate profit and  ) ( ) ( ) ( =
0 θ θ θ dG y x Y ∫
∞
 is aggregate output. 
Each unit of tax revenue is transformed into one unit of a public good. I call ρ  the total amount 




= ρ   (5) 
Each firm has access to ρ  units of the public good,
5
) (ρ h
 and their contribution to a firm's production 
process is given by  , where h has the following properties:  0 > ) (θ
' h  and  0 < ) (θ
' ' h . Thus, public 




; in addition, they are subject to decreasing returns. 
Given a CDF  ) (θ G , a tax rate τ , and a rental price for capital r , an equilibrium in this economy is an 
allocation of capital and labor across operating plants  )} ( ), ( { θ θ l k  and operating decisions  )} ( { θ x , a 
                                                      
4 It is not my goal to study optimal taxation issues. I choose this tax system because of its neutrality. In a version of this 
model with no public goods and perfect tax enforcement (a version I use as a benchmark), taxing profits is fully neutral; in other 
words, the equilibrium is independent of the tax rate.  
5 This is the case of a public good that is rival but not excludable, and therefore it is subject to congestion. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) argue that this kind of public good applies to highways and other transportation facilities, water and sewer 
systems, courts and domestic security. 
6 I avoid indeterminacies restricting τ  to be strictly positive and less than1. 5 
 
quantity of public goods available to each operating firm ρ , and a price w all satisfying the following 
conditions:  
1.  ) (θ k and  ) (θ l  solve Equation 1 for any  1} = ) ( : { θ θ θ x ∈   
2.  ) ( ) ( ) ( = 1







Denote an equilibrium for a given tax rate τ  as  } , )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( {{ = ) ( w x l k ρ θ θ θ τ ξ . 









θ θ θ ≥
, where b  is a constant bigger than 1, and z  is a finite positive 




Proposition 1. Given Assumption   and a tax rate  (0,1) ∈ τ  there is a unique equilibrium wage w and a 
unique cutoff value  0 θ  such that  0 = ) ( 0 θ π ,  0 > ) (θ π  for  0 >θ θ , and  0 < ) (θ π  for  0 <θ θ . 
No-Public-Goods Case 
Consider an economy with no public goods such that  1 = ) (ρ h . This will be the Lucas span-of-control 
model without the occupational choice margin. I show in Appendix C that if  ) ~ (τ ξ  is an equilibrium for a 
given tax rate τ , then it is also an equilibrium for a different tax rate τ ~ , where τ  and τ ~ are in (0,1) . In 
other words, in the absence of public goods and under perfect tax enforcement, taxing profits is fully 
neutral. I am interested in the neutrality of the tax system due to the following. Suppose the tax system 
was distortive, and at the same time the government had almost no capacity to enforce tax compliance. 
This would be equivalent to having a very low effective tax rate and therefore almost no tax distortion in 
the economy. I explicitly want to avoid this positive effect on efficiency of a poor government's tax 
enforcement capacity. 
Imperfect Tax Enforcement 
Consider now the case in which the government has limited ability to enforce tax compliance. In this case 
an entrepreneur θ  must decide whether to run a firm and comply with tax payments, or to run a firm 
without paying taxes,
8
I model the probability of getting caught by the government as increasing in output. Thus, the 
higher the production level of a firm, the higher the probability of getting caught. Even though I take this 
probability as an exogenous feature of the model, it is not difficult to justify a government that puts more 
effort into enforcing tax compliance among big firms than small ones. This idea has been used by De 
Paula and Scheinkman (2006). For convenience I focus on the probability of not getting caught, which 
accordingly is decreasing in output. I denote the conditional probability of not getting caught as 
 or simply not to run a firm. In making that decision, firms take into account the 
probability of getting caught by the government if not paying taxes. If a firm is caught, then its profits are 
seized. The perfect enforcement case analyzed above can be understood as a particular case in which the 
firm always gets caught. I label a firm that decides not to pay taxes as informal, and conversely, one that 
does decide to pay taxes as formal. 
                                                      
7 This assumption is satisfied by a Pareto distribution with parameter α  and  α < < 0 z . 
8 Here I consider the case of a discrete decision, namely, paying all taxes or no taxes. I'm currently working on a continuous 
version where firms decide how much to pay in taxes. 6 
 
) | caught"   getting not  " ( y P and use  ) (y P as shorthand.  ) (y P  satisfies the following conditions: 
1 = (0) P  and  0 ) ( ≤ y P
'
. 
Definition 1: A tax enforcement technology is a probability  ) (y P  that a firm does not get caught 
if it does not pay taxes.  ) (y P  is a better tax enforcement technology than  ) (
~
y P  if  ) (
~
) ( y P y P ≤  and 
) (
~
< ) ( y P y P  for at least some  y .  
All entrepreneurs’ decisions are made at the beginning of the period. At the end of the period all 
households will be in one of two mutually exclusive states: caught ( c σ ) or not caught ( nc σ ). Denote  F x  
as the decision to run a formal firm, and  I x  as the decision to run an informal firm. Entrepreneur θ  
maximizes expected consumption and solves the following program: 
 
) ( )) ( (1 ) ( ) (    max
, {0,1}, {0,1},
c cn
l k F x I x
c y P c y P σ σ − +
∈ ∈  
(6) 
  2
) , ( ) ( =
ˆ ) ~ (0 ) ~ )( (1 = ) (
~ ) ~ ( ) ~ )( (1 = ) ( s.t.
≠ +
+ + − + − − − −





l k f h y
c w c x c rk wl y x c





One can break this problem into three problems: The first is under the assumption that 
entrepreneur θ  has decided to run a formal firm; the second is under the assumption that she has decided 
to run an informal firm; and the third is the decision between running a formal or an informal firm or 
simply not running any type of firm. For the first of these problems entrepreneur θ  solves the same 
program as in Equation 2. I relabel  ) (θ l  as  ) (θ F l  and  ) (θ k  as  ) (θ F k , and define  ) (θ F y  and  ) (θ π F  in 
the obvious way. 
Now take the decision of running an informal firm as given. In this case the entrepreneur θ  
solves the following program:  
 
c w c rk wl y y P
l k
ˆ ] ~ ) )( ( [ max
,
+ + − − −   (7) 
   
γ θ ρ ) , ( ) ( = s.t. l k f h y  
Define  ) (θ I l   and  ) (θ I k   as the solutions to Equation 7. Also,  )) ( ), ( ( ) ( = ) ( θ θ θ ρ θ I I I l k f h y   and 
c rk wl y y P I I I I I ˆ )) ( ) ( ) ( ))( ( ( = ) ( − − − θ θ θ θ θ π . 
Proposition 2: Given prices w and r , a tax rate  (0,1) ∈ τ , and a quantity ρ  of public goods per firm 
) ( ) ( θ θ F I y y ≤ , then 
Proof: let  ) ; ( θ y C  be the corresponding cost-function for an entrepreneur with quality θ .  ) (y P  is 
nonincreasing in  y , and  ) (θ F y  maximizes  ) , ( θ y C y− . Therefore if  ) ( > ~ θ F y y  then:  
)) , ~ ( ~ )( ~ ( > )) ), ( ( ) ( ))( ( ( θ θ θ θ θ y C y y P y C y y P F F F − −             q.e.d. 7 
 
Now consider the decision of being a formal firm, or an informal firm, or not running a firm. 
Entrepreneur θ  decides to be formal if  ) ( > ) ( θ π θ π I F  and  0 ) ( ≥ θ π F . In this case  1 = ) (θ F x ; 
otherwise,  0 = ) (θ F x . If  ) ( ) ( θ π θ π F I ≥  and  0 ) ( ≥ θ π I , then the optimal decision is to run an informal 
firm, and  1 = ) (θ I x ; otherwise,  0 = ) (θ I x . If  0 = ) ( ) ( θ θ I F x x + , then it is optimal not to run a firm. 
As before, the provision of public goods is fully funded by tax revenues.
9
) ( ) ( ~ ) (1 = = θ θ τ γ τ τ
θ dG x c Y T F F F ∫ − − Π
 However, tax revenues 
are now provided only by formal firms, such that  
,
 
where  ) ( ) ( ) ( =
0 θ θ θ dG y x Y F F F ∫
∞
 is the aggregate output of the formal sector, and 
) ( ) ( ) ( =
0 θ θ π θ dG x F F F ∫
∞
Π  is the aggregate profit of the formal sector. ρ  is the total amount of public 












  (8) 
The first term in Equation 8 shows that as the relative importance of the formal sector declines, so does 
the available amount of public goods for each formal or informal firm. 
Equilibriums in this economy, given a CDF  ) (θ G , a tax enforcement technology  ) (y P , a tax 
rate τ , and a rental price for capital r , are an allocation of capital and labor across operating plants in the 
informal sector  )} ( ), ( { θ θ I I l k ; an allocation of capital and labor across operating plants in the formal 
sector  )} ( ), ( { θ θ F F l k ; operating decisions  )} ( ), ( { θ θ F I x x ; a quantity of public goods available to each 
operating firm ρ ; and a price w, all satisfying the following conditions:  
1.  ) (θ I k  and  ) (θ I l  solve Equation 5 for any  1 = ) ( : { θ θ θ I x ∈   
2.  ) (θ F k  and  ) (θ F l  solve Equation 1 for any  1} = ) ( : { θ θ θ F x ∈   
3.  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( = 1
0 0 θ θ θ θ θ θ dG l x dG l x F F I I ∫ ∫
∞ ∞




ρ =   
I name an equilibrium for a given tax rate τ  and a given tax enforcement technology  ) (y P  as 
} , )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( {{ = ) , ( w x x l l k k P F I F I F I ρ θ θ θ θ θ θ τ ξ . 
The Government 
In this economy the government collects revenue from taxing the profits of firms with a common tax rate 
τ . There is no other tax system. All tax revenues are automatically converted into public goods. The 
government is endowed with a tax enforcement technology  ) (y P . I will consider two cases for 
determining the tax rate τ . First, I consider a government that exogenously inherits a tax rate that cannot 
change. I label this as the passive government case, and it will allow me to study an economy with a 
suboptimal provision of public goods for a given tax enforcement technology. Second, I consider a 
                                                      
9I assume that if a firm is effectively caught, then the corresponding seized profits cannot be used to finance public goods. 
For simplicity, I assume those seized profits are destroyed. 8 
 
benevolent government that chooses a tax rate τ  in order to maximize aggregate consumption. I call this 
the active government case. Notice that the only choice available to the government is the selection of 
the tax rate τ  while taking the competitive behavior of firms as given. The government solves the 
following program: 
  C max
(0,1) ∈ τ
  (9) 
subject to:  
c w dG x dG x C F F I I ˆ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( =
0 0 + + +∫ ∫
∞ ∞
θ θ π θ θ θ π θ  
) , ( } )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( { )}, ( {{ P x x l l k k F I F I F I τ ξ ρ θ θ θ θ θ θ ∈ . 9 
 
3.  CALIBRATION STRATEGY 
I choose  ) , ( l k f  to be Cobb-Douglas such that 
α α − 1 = ) , ( l k l k f  and where α  captures the share of 
capital income out of aggregate labor and capital income. I follow the conventional choice of one-third 
for α . Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) I choose 0.85 for γ , the diminishing-returns-to-scale 
parameter. This implies that in an economy with perfect tax enforcement, total variable costs represent 15 
percent of aggregate output. I also follow Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) in choosing 4 percent for the interest 
rate r . 
I calibrate  ) (θ G , the distribution of entrepreneurs' quality, by looking at the observed size 
distribution of firms in the U.S. economy. I assume that the U.S. government runs a perfect tax 
enforcement technology, and I set  ) (ρ h  as given and equal to 1. In other words, I revert to a modified 
version of the Lucas (1978) span-of-control model with perfect tax enforcement and no public goods, 
which I use as the benchmark model. According to Axtell (2001), the observed size distribution of firms 
(in terms of the number of workers) can be parameterized as a Pareto distribution with parameter δ . I 




, then the size distribution of firms also follows a Pareto distribution with parameter δ . Therefore, 




 and support  ) , [ ∞ M θ . Call  0 L  the number of workers in 
the smallest operating firm, and L the average firm size. Using  2 = 0 L  and the observed average firm 
size  21.8 = L , I am able to pin down δ
10
M θ  and  . I set the initial household endowment c ˆ to be equal 
to c ~ , so any household is at least able to pay for the fixed cost c ~ if the entrepeneur decides to run a firm. 
The fixed cost c ~  is arbitrarily set equal to 1. The calibration strategy is summarized in Table 1. I do not 
need to choose a tax rate for the benchmark model since the endogenous variables are independent of τ . 
                                                      











Table 1. Calibration of the benchmark model 
Parameters, variables  Source of numerical values, assumptions 
Exogenous parameters 
0 ) ( = y P   
Perfect tax enforcement  
1 ) ( = ρ h   
No public goods  
α α − =






Capital share of output net of profits  
85 . 0 = γ   
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)  
0 L  = 2  
Axtell (2001)  












Observed size distribution of firms fitting a Pareto 
distribution  
c c ~ ˆ =    Initial household endowment  























Consistent with U.S. size distribution of firms  ) ( ~ L g   






99228 . 0 = M θ    2 = ) ( 0 θ l   
Endogenous variables 
5102 . 1 0 = θ   
  
8889 . 1 = w      
Next I specify the  ) (ρ h  function, which determines the importance of public goods in the model. 
I consider the following specific form:  
0 >   1, < < 0 = ) ( σ η σρ ρ
η h . 
Thus, public goods are essential and are subject to diminishing returns. In order to calibrate the 
parameters σ  and η , I take the following steps:  
1.  I compute the equilibrium for the benchmark model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Call it 
US ξ . 11 
 
2.  I add public goods to the benchmark model and assume that the government chooses a tax 
rate 
* τ  that maximizes aggregate consumption C . Call the corresponding equilibrium 
US ) (
* τ ξ . 
3.  I find the parameters σ  and η  such that  US US ) ( =
* τ ξ ξ .  
The underlying reasoning is that observable allocations and prices for the U.S. economy that 
allow for the calibration of the benchmark model are consistent with a provision of public goods close to 
its optimal level. In terms of the model, the two conditions to pin down parameters σ  and η  are 
  1 = )) ( (
* t h ρ   (10) 
and 





  (11) 
Appendix C shows that when public goods are added to the benchmark model, then 
)
1
)(1 (1 = ) (
δ
δ
γ τ τ ρ
−
− − . 
The ideal estimation for 
* τ  would be spending on public goods as a fraction of GDP in the 
United States. Given the lack of that information, I take two approaches. First, I rely on the observed tax 
rate on profits. In the United States, profits of C corporations are subject to four basic tax rates: 15, 25, 
34, and 35 percent. However, any taxable income above $75,000 is subject to a tax rate of 34 percent or 
higher (39 percent being the highest). In the model I consider a flat tax schedule such that any unit of 
profit is taxed at the same rate. There is also a difference between the definition of profits in the model 
and what is typically considered taxable income of corporations in the United States and abroad. Taxable 
income of corporate profits typically reflects total revenues less payments to factors of production other 
than those financed by shareholders; however, in the model, payments to all factors of production are 
subtracted from revenues. Therefore, the observed tax rate should enter the model with an upward 
correction. I call ω  to the fraction of capital provided by nonshareholders. Then the adjusted tax rate τ  
and the observed tax rate τ ~  are related according to  








)) (1 (1 1 ~ =
.
 
The model considers the observed tax rate to be 34 percent, and for ω  I use the average ratio of 
liabilities to the sum of equity and liabilities for U.S. firms. This average is 37.1 percent,
11
) ; ( η ρ h
 and the 
corresponding adjusted tax rate is 74.4 percent. At this adjusted tax rate, government expenditures in 
public goods reach 10.13 percent of aggregate output. This number is approximately one-third of the total 
government expenditures in the United States (which represents 30 percent of GDP). Second, I assume 
that one-fourth of government expenditures in the United States are devoted to the provision of public 
goods. This delivers a more conservative estimate for the adjusted tax rate, 55 percent. Table 2 
summarizes the calibration strategy for  . 
                                                      
11 I would like to thank Daisuke Miyakawa, who computed this ratio for me using Compustat. 12 
 
Table 2. Calibration of public goods function  ) (ρ h  
η σρ η σ ρ = ) ,   ;   ( h  
Parameters, variables  Source of numerical values, assumptions 
* τ  based on observed tax rate 
τ ~    =   34%  observed tax rate 
ω     =  




, (Compustat)  
* τ     =  
 74.4%     adjusted tax rate  
σ     =  
 1.31142    calibrated parameter  
η     =  
 0.11843    calibrated parameter  
ρ     =  
 10.13%     ratio of public goods expenditures to output  
 
* τ  based on expenditures in public goods  
ρ     =  
 7.5%     assuming expenditures in public goods  US G
4
1
=   
* τ     =  
 55%    adjusted tax rate  
σ     =  
 1.24275    calibrated parameter  
η     =  
 0.08387     calibrated parameter  
Finally, the model introduces the probability that a firm does not get caught if it does not pay 
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with  1 < < 0 φ . Figure 1 shows the shape of this function. I set the parameter  y  to be slightly above the 
output level of the smallest firm in the benchmark model.
12
) (θ I y
 This functional form provides a closed form 






















<   if ) (
1
1
  if ) (






































) ) ( (
1









                                                      
12 It is 0.5 above. This addition is needed to prevent some very small firms from becoming formal instead of informal. 13 
 




the case of a government fully incapable of enforcing tax compliance ( ), then informal firms do not 
need to hide through reductions in their output levels and will choose the same output as if they were 









. I leave the parameter φ  free, 
which allows me to introduce different levels of tax enforcement capacity into the model. As φ  moves 
from 0 to 1, the tax enforcement technology improves. 
Figure 1. Tax enforcement technology  ) (y P  
 
                                                      
13 This is for  ) , ( 1 θ θ θ ∈ . 14 
 
4.  RESULTS 
In the previous section I showed the choices for the functional forms and parameters implied by the 
model, except for the parameter φ  of the tax enforcement technology  ) (y P . An extreme case is  0 = φ , 
which implies no tax enforcement at all, so that any firm can avoid paying taxes and not get caught. As φ  
increases, conditional on output level, the probability that a firm gets caught is increased,
14
φ
 and therefore 
according to Definition 1 the tax enforcement technology improves. Since I am interested in the potential 
effects of a poor tax enforcement technology, I solve the model for different values of   and investigate 
for differences in aggregate output, measured TFP, equilibrium wage rate, the size of the informal sector, 
and the average size of firms. The discipline on how far φ  can increase is given by the model's prediction 
of the size of the informal economy. I use as a benchmark the perfect enforcement case in which all firms 
comply with tax payments. 
I consider two cases for the government's behavior. One case assumes a benevolent government 
that, given a tax enforcement technology, chooses a tax rate  [0,1) ∈ τ  such that aggregate consumption 
C  is maximized. I call this the active government case. I also consider a passive government case in 
which the government exogenously inherits a tax rate that cannot adjust. 
In addition I study the effects of an imperfect tax enforcement technology in the absence of public 
goods. In the model, as the tax enforcement technology worsens, ceteris paribus, more firms become 
informal, and therefore tax revenues and the provision of public goods per unit of output decreases. This 
in turn reduces productivity of all of the operating firms. In the absence of public goods, this effect is not 
present. However, given a poor tax enforcement technology, the incentives for a firm to become informal 
are still at work. A subset of firms may optimally choose not to pay taxes and may reduce their input 
demands relative to the perfect enforcement case. This puts into work a general equilibrium effect that 
distorts the allocation of resources across firms. I call this the no-public-goods case. Since a benevolent 
or active government would like to minimize the effects of its imperfect tax enforcement, it will trivially 
choose a zero tax rate; therefore, I only consider the no-public-goods case under the assumption of a 
passive government. 
Table 3 summarizes the results for different cases. In particular, the public goods function  (.) h  
has been calibrated so that the optimal provision of public goods is 10.13 percent of aggregate output and 
is consistent with  74.4% = τ . As exhibited in the top panel of Table 3, I consider a tax enforcement 
technology  ) (y P  with parameter  0.15 = φ . To interpret this number I compute the probability that a 
firm in the 90th percentile of the size distribution of firms
15
                                                      
14 This holds for any output level bigger than 
 gets caught if it does not pay taxes. This 
probability is 26.1 percent. At this level of tax enforcement capacity and assuming a benevolent 
government, the model predicts an output level 12.1 percent below the perfect enforcement case, and an 
informal sector that accounts for 30.3 percent of aggregate output. Moreover, observed TFP and wages 
are 8.6 and 12.7 percent below the benchmark case. According to Schneider (2004), more than half of a 
sample of 144 countries, mainly developing economies, exhibit similar or higher levels of informal 
output. At this level of tax enforcement capacity, the government finds it optimal to set the tax rate at 46 
percent, well below the optimal tax rate of the benchmark case. Reducing the tax rate positively affects 
the consumption of households running formal firms. Also, ceteris paribus, it reduces tax collection and 
therefore the provision of public firms. However, this effect is compensated by a reduction in the number 




15 This corresponds to the size distribution of operating firms under the benchmark case. 15 
 
Table 3. Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement 
                                                               Optimal   in benchmark model 
  Aggregate 
output  
TFP  W age    Informal 
output 
(%) 
           
  Perfect enforcement 
           
Benchmark model  3.333  1.361  1.888  1.510  0.00 
   
  I mperfect enforcement 
   
   
- Active government (   2.931  1.244  1.648  1.527  30.29 
- Passive government  2.929  1.245  1.636  1.519  56.57 
No public goods  3.317  1.361  1.853  1.493  56.57 
           
   
- Active government (   3.006  1.267  1.689  1.521  23.53 
- Passive government  3.049  1.283  1.700  1.508  44.54 
No public goods  3.314  1.361  1.848  1.491  44.54 
           
   
- Active government (   3.103  1.296  1.745  1.514  13.58 
- Passive government  3.178  1.322  1.771  1.497  28.15 
No public goods  3.307  1.360  1.843  1.489  28.15 
           
  0.15  0.20  0.30     
Probability a firm in 90th percentile gets 
caught 
26.13%  33.22%  45.43%     
In addition, I find a selection effect that reduces the number of operating firms by 7.8 percent 
relative to the benchmark. These are firms that would be operating if it were not for the fact that the 
government operates a poor tax enforcement technology. Two countereffects are at work: First, wages 
that are lower than in the benchmark will lead to entry of low-productivity firms (negative selection). 
Second, scarce provision of public goods negatively affects the productivity of all firms and will lead to 
the exit of low-productivity firms (positive selection). The empirical results show that the second effect 
dominates. When I solve the model for the same tax enforcement level, assuming a passive government, 
the effects on output, TFP, and wages are very similar. However, the size of the informal sector is much 
higher at 56.6 percent.
16
                                                     
16 Countries at this level of informal sector size are Nigeria, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Peru, Azerbaijan, 
Panama, Bolivia, and Georgia 
 Also, the selection effect is lower, accounting for an exit of 4.2 percent of firms 
relative to the benchmark model. 16 
 
When considering the no-public-goods case, the negative effects of the poor tax enforcement 
technology over output, TFP, and wages are drastically reduced. Aggregate output now is less than 1 
percent below the benchmark, the effect on TFP is negligible, and wages are lower by 2 percent. 
However, now there is a negative selection effect instead of a positive one. The size of this effect is 8.67 
percent, which means this is the fraction of additional operating firms relative to the benchmark, which 
would not have operated with perfect enforcement. Since in this case the effect of public goods provision 
on productivity is not present, the only mechanism at work comes through lower wages. What I conclude 
from these results is that in the model, sizable effects of a poor tax enforcement technology arise only 
under the presence of the public goods mechanism. In a broader sense, this points to the idea that 
distortions that mainly affect the left tail of the size distribution of firms (small firms) will have limited 
aggregate effects unless there is a more direct feedback effect over the entire distribution beyond the 
standard general equilibrium effects. 
In the middle and bottom panels of Table 3, I consider less severe tax enforcement inefficiencies. 
The model predicts lower levels of informality (24 percent and 14 percent) and, as expected, smaller 
reductions—albeit still significant—in aggregate output, TFP, and wages. Equilibrium aggregate output is 
reduced by 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively. Also notice that in the absence of public goods, a low 
tax enforcement capacity can deliver equilibrium output, TFP, and wages that are higher than in an 
economy with a better enforcement technology. That occurs because at low levels of enforcement, 
informal firms have almost no incentive to reduce their output levels relative to the output they would 
have chosen under perfect tax enforcement. At the same time, the effect of informal firms on provision of 
public goods and overall productivity is not present. 
Table 4 shows some predictions of the model for firm size and distribution of the labor force 
across formal and informal firms. Since by construction the tax enforcement capacity of the government 
is higher among large firms, the model predicts that informal firms belong to left tail of the size 
distribution of firms, while formal ones belong to the right tail. Also, the model predicts a discontinuity in 
the size distribution of firms such that no firms of intermediate size will be observed. This feature of the 
model matches qualitatively with the "missing middle," in which there is a smaller number of medium-
size firms in less developed countries relative to what it is observed in developed countries. Tybout 
(2000) has documented the missing middle for the manufacturing sector. 
In the model, the range of the missing middle and the "mean missing size" decrease with tax 
enforcement capacity. Similar predictions apply to the informal sector. When considering a low tax-
enforcement technology (top panel of Table 4), the informal sector is populated by firms with less than 
108 workers. And the missing middle is in the range of firms with 108 to 128 workers. Tybout (2000) 
shows evidence of a missing middle in the range of 20 to 100 workers for a country like Mexico, where 
the size of the informal sector is 30 percent. Therefore, it seems that the average missing middle the 
model predicts is too high. I claim this is in part because there is another well-studied fact of informal 
(small) firms in least developed countries that the model does not incorporate, namely, that informal firms 
are significantly more labor-intensive than formal ones (Amaral and Quintin 2006; Tybout 2000).  
One can think that this empirical evidence can be matched to the model by adding size-dependent 
financial frictions (as in Amaral and Quintin 2006) or a probability of detection increasing in capital (as in 
De Paula and Scheinkman 2006). I leave these modifications as candidates for future improvements of the 
model and for now simply claim that these modifications will at least reduce the lower bound of the 
missing middle predicted by the model. As one considers better tax enforcement technologies (middle and 
bottom panels of Table 4), the model's prediction for the missing middle looks closer to the empirical 
evidence. The model also does well in predicting a negative correlation between the fraction of the labor 
force in the informal sector and the level of tax enforcement capacity. 17 
 
Table 4. Labor force and firm size (  74.4% = τ  in benchmark ) 
  M ean  Informal sector  Formal 
  size  LF(%)  Min  M ean  Max  Min 
             
  Perfect enforcement 
Benchmark model   21.8  0.00  --  --  --  2.00 
             
  Imperfect enforcement 
   
Active government   23.68  29.76  2.29  7.13  108  128.73 
Passive government   22.78  55.94  2.31  12.74  17,395  20,705 
    No public goods   20.11  55.94  2.04  11.25  15,361  18,284 
             
   
Active government   22.96  22.89  2.24  5.42  41  53 
Passive government   21.63  43.65  2.22  9.45  1,550  1,982 
    No public goods   19.91  43.65  2.04  8.70  1,426  1,823 
             
   
Active government   22.34  14.45  2.18  3.56  12.80  18.68 
Passive government   20.49  26.95  2.13  5.57  110.02  166.67 
    No public goods   19.69  26.95  2.05  5.35  105.74  160.18 
             
 
0.15  0.20 0.30       
Probability a firm in 90th 







     
In Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2, I show results under the assumption that aggregate consumption 
is maximized when expenditures on public goods represent 7.5 percent of the aggregate output in the 
benchmark economy. This implies a tax rate on profits of 55 percent. In the case where the optimal tax 
rate equals 74.4 percent, the aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement are reduced. When analyzing 
a low tax enforcement capacity  0.15) = (φ , the result is that aggregate output is lower by 6.3 percent, 
observed TFP by 4.4 percent, and wages by 6.9 percent, where all figures are relative to the benchmark 
model; and the size of the informal economy reaches 24.38 percent. At this level of lack of enforcement, 
an active government will set the tax rate at 39 percent, 16 points lower than the corresponding optimal 
tax rate for the benchmark economy. I confirm also that without public goods in the model, it is very 
difficult to obtain sizable effects on output, TFP, and wages. In the absence of public goods, the reduction 
on equilibrium aggregate output generated is lower than 0.5 percent. 18 
 
5.  FINAL COMMENTS 
In this paper I investigate the economic implications of technological differences in the government side 
of the economy. In particular I study economies that have access to the same set of resources and 
productive technologies, but where governments are endowed with different technologies to enforce tax 
compliance. My implicit assumption is that while private technologies can freely flow across economies, 
this is not the case for some government-related technologies. 
The paper shows that a government's lack of tax enforcement capacity may have implications for 
aggregate output, TFP, wages, and the size of the informal economy. I mainly exploit two mechanisms 
through which government's lack of tax enforcement capacity distorts the economy. First, provided that 
the government operates a tax enforcement technology that is more efficient in detecting tax evasion by 
large firms  than small ones, firms face an incentive to reduce their optimal output level. Second, a poor 
tax enforcement technology may lead to a fiscal problem and low provision of productive public goods. 
The results for a calibrated version of the model suggest that in economies where the government has 
limited capacity to enforce tax compliance, aggregate output is lower by 12 percent and TFP by 9 percent 
relative to an economy where the government can perfectly enforce tax compliance. Moreover, poor tax 
enforcement suggests an informal sector that accounts for 30 percent or more of aggregate output. 
Based on the numerical predictions of the model I also conclude that sizable aggregate effects can 
be reached only when the public goods mechanism is at work. This suggests that any competitive 
equilibrium model that introduces a friction distorting mainly economic decisions on the left tail of the 
size distribution of firms (small firms) will not be able to deliver sizable aggregate effects unless it also 
incorporates an externality or feedback effect (beyond standard general equilibrium effects) on the right 
tail of the distribution (large firms). This is because distorting decisions of small and medium-size firms is 
equivalent to a distortion that only binds a small share of the economic activity. 19 
 
APPENDIX A: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Table A.1. Facts 1a and 1b: Cross-country evidence (Correlation, Number of Observation)  
  Informal sector  T ax revenues  Tax compliance 
  (% GDP)  (% GDP)   
Paved roads per capita   -0.5154*  0.3934*  0.3726* 
  136  106  43 
Paved roads per km2  -0.4448*  0.1906*  0.3222* 
  136  106  43 
Days to resolve a debt dispute  0.2396*  -0.2328*  -0.4517* 
  143  95  43 
Cost to resolve debt dispute  0.1998*  -0.2185*  -0.3609* 
  143  95  43 
Data Source: Schneider (2004), Caselli (2004), World Development Indicators  
Ross Levine, "Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development" 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publications.htmData 
Note: *10% significance level; GPD (1+informal size) was also used.  
 
Table A.2. Facts 2 and 3: Cross-country evidence (Correlations, Number of observations) 
  GDP per capita  Y /L    TFP   TFP  
           H adjusted  
         
 Paved roads per capita   0.7302*    0.7806*    0.7059*    0.5694*  
   162    100    99    90  
 Paved roads per km
2   0.5321*    0.5936*    0.5453*    0.4896*  
   162    100    99    90  
 Days to resolve a debt dispute   -0.2841*    -0.3119*    -0.2641*    -0.1159  
   142    100    99    89  
 Cost to resolve debt dispute   -0.3531*    -0.3944*    -0.4327*    -0.4295*  
   142    100    99    89  
 Informal sector (% GDP)   -0.6889*    -0.7396*    -0.7103*    -0.6041*  
   135    96    95    85  
Data Source: Schneider (2004), Caselli (2004), World Development Indicators  
Ross Levine, "Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development" 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publications.htmData 
Note: * 10% significance level; GPD(1+informal size) was also used; H: Human capital 20 
 
APPENDIX B: NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Table B.1. Effects of imperfect tax enforcement
                                                             Optimal   in Benchmark Model 
  Aggregate 
output  
TFP  W age    Informal 
output (%) 
           
  Perfect enforcement 
           
Benchmark model  3.333  1.361  1.888  1.510  0.00 
   
  Imperfect enforcement 
   
   
- Active government (   3.122  1.301  1.758  1.516  24.38 
- Passive government  3.174  1.318  1.781  1.508  37.99 
No public goods  3.322  1.361  1.864  1.499  37.99 
           
   
- Active government (   3.170  1.315  1.785  1.512  17.62 
- Passive government  3.229  1.334  1.812  1.504  28.03 
No public goods  3.320  1.361  1.863  1.498  28.03 
           
   
- Active government (   3.232  1.333  1.824  1.510  7.77 
- Passive government  3.289  1.351  1.848  1.500  14.83 
No public goods  3.319  1.360  1.865  1.499  14.83 
           
  0.15  0.20  0.30     
Probability a firm in 90th percentile gets 
caught 
26.13%  33.22%  45.43%     21 
 
Table B.2. Labor force and firm size (  55% = τ  in benchmark ) 
  M ean  Informal sector  Formal 
  size  LF(%)  Min  M ean  Max  Min 
             
  Perfect enforcement 
Benchmark model   21.8  0.00  --  --  --  2.00 
             
  Imperfect enforcement 
 
Active government   23.17  32.65  2.20  7.63  141.74  158.25 
Passive government   21.61  37.40  2.12  8.11  358.30  426.47 
    No public goods   20.65  37.40  2.02  7.74  342.32  407.45 
             
 
Active government   22.43  23.92  2.15  5.54  41.41  49.29 
Passive government  21.17 27.32 2.09 5.87 77.72 99.34
    No public goods   20.58  27.32  2.03  5.70  75.57  96.60 
             
 
Active government   21.83  7.38  2.07  2.30  4.07  6.17 
Passive government   20.85  14.10  2.04  3.24  11.72  17.76 
    No public goods   20.66  14.10  2.03  3.21  11.62  17.60 
             
  0.15  0.20  0.30       
Probability a firm in 90th 
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APPENDIX C: STATEMENTS AND PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
C.1. Output is Increasing in θ  
By assumption  ) , ( l k f  is homogenous of degree 1 in k  and l. Therefore it can be expressed as 
f(k) = ) , ( l l k f where 
l
k
= k . 
Cost function:  
rk wl
l k
+    min
,
 
γ θ ρ )) f(k ( ) ( =    s.t. l h y  
First-order conditions:  
  ) ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( =
1 k k f k f k lf h w k −
− γ θγ ρ λ   (12) 
  ) ( )) ( ( ) ( =
1 k f k lf h r k
− γ θγ ρ λ   (13) 









Given standard production function conditions  0 > (k) fk  and  0 < (k) fkk  and using the implicit function 
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Use the first-order condition:  
  ) ( = 1 y C
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Since  1 < < 0 γ ,  ) (θ y  is increasing in θ . 23 
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C.2 Labor Demand is Increasing in θ  



















θ ρ γ .
  (17) 
Plug Equation 17 and  ) (θ y  into Equation 14 and get optimal labor decision:  
  ) (
k
1










  (18) 
Since  ) (θ y  is increasing in θ  then  ) (θ l  is also increasing in θ . 
C.3. Profits 
From Equation 18:  
) ( = ) k )( ( θ γ θ y r w l + . 
Therefore,  
) ~ ) ( ) )((1 (1 = ) ( c y − − − θ γ τ θ π . 
Since  ) (θ y  is increasing in θ , then  ) (θ π  is also increasing in θ . 
C.4. Proof of Proposition 1 
0 > ) (θ π
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Zero-profit condition: 
Condition  0 = ) ( 0 θ π  implies  
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− −γ τ ρ
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where b  is a constant greater than 1. 
Apply the implicit function theorem to Equation 20 and get  
  )) ( , ( = 0 1 ρ θ h w w ,  (21) 
which is an increasing function in  0 θ . By inspection it is easy to see that as  0 0 → θ  also  0 → w . 
Labor market equilibrium: 
Express  
) ( ) ( ) ( = 1
























Plug  ) (θ l  and Equation 19 into this expression:  
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Multiply and divide Equation 22 by  ) ( 1 0 θ G −  and use Assumption 1: 
  )) ( (1
k
1









  (23) 
Apply the implicit function theorem to Equation 23 and get 
  ) ( = 0 2 θ w w ,  (24) 
which is a decreasing function of  0 θ . By inspection it is easy to see that as  0 0 → θ  then  ∞ → w . 
Equations 21 and 24 intersect once. Then there is a unique  0 θ  that satisfies 
0 > ) ( = ) ( 0 2 0 1 θ θ w w . 
C.5. Benchmark Model's Equilibrium is Independent of τ  
In the benchmark model,  1 = ) (ρ h . Therefore Equation 21 becomes independent of τ . Equation 24 is 
also independent of τ . Therefore, any pair  } , { 0 θ w  that satisfies Equations 21 and 24 is independent of 
τ . 25 
 
C.6. Pareto Distribution of θ  
Let's assume that employment l  follows a Pareto distribution with parameters δ   and  0 L . The 
corresponding density function is 
0 1








In the standard model, employment l is related to θ  according to:  







Then, I can infer a density function for θ  according to:  
) ( =   and
) (
)) ( ( = ) ( 0 0 θ
θ
θ































. A property of the Pareto distribution is 
that one can interpret  ) (θ g   as the density function of θ   conditional on  0 >θ θ . And by the same 
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C.7. Public Goods 
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